It is interesting and symptomatic that Fox's own remarkable book, Lions of the Punjab, from which these sentences have been taken, shares in common with other influential diagnosticians of anthropology's mal du siecle-for it is that I think-like Sherry Ortner,7 that the salutary alternative is a practice based on practice, fortified with ideas about hegemony, social reproduction, and ideology on loan from such nonanthropologists as Antonio Gramsci, Raymond Williams, Alain Touraine, and Pierre Bourdieu. Nevertheless, the impression of a deep sentiment of Kuhnian paradigm-exhaustion persists, with consequences for the status of anthropology that must be, I believe, extraordinarily unsettling.
I suppose there is also some (justified) fear that today's anthropologists can no longer go to the postcolonial field with quite the same ease as in former times. This of course is a political challenge to ethnography on exactly the same terrain where, in earlier times, anthropologists were relatively sovereign. Responses have varied. Some have in a sense retreated to the politics of textuality. Others have used the violence emanating from the field as a topic for postmodern theory. And third, some have utilized anthropological discourse as the site for constructing models of social change or transformation. None of these responses, however, is as optimistic about the enterprise as were the revisionist contributors to Dell Hymes' Reinventing Anthropology, or Stanley Diamond in his important In Search of the Primitive, an academic generation earlier.
Finally, the word "interlocutors." Here again I am struck by the extent to which the notion of an interlocutor is so unstable as to split quite dramatically into two fundamentally discrepant meanings. On the one hand it reverberates against a whole background of colonial conflict, in which the colonizers search for an interlocuteur valable, and the colonized on the other are driven increasingly to more and more desperate remedies as they try first to fit the categories formulated by the colonial authority, then, acknowledging that such a course is doomed to failure, decide that only their own military force will compel Paris or London to take them seriously as interlocutors. An interlocutor in the colonial situation is therefore by definition either someone who is compliant and belongs to The other meaning for "interlocutor" is a good deal less political. It derives from an almost entirely academic or theoretical environment, and suggests the calm as well as the antiseptic, controlled quality of a thought-experiment. In this context the interlocutor is someone who has perhaps been found clamoring on the doorstep, where from outside a discipline or field he or she has made so unseemly a disturbance as to be let in, guns or stones checked in with the porter, for further discussion. The domesticated result brings to mind a number of fashionable theoretical correlatives, for example, Bakhtinian dialogism and heteroglossia, Jirgen Habermas' "ideal speech situation," or Richard Rorty's picture (at the end of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature) of philosophers discoursing animatedly in a handsomely appointed salon. If such a description of interlocutor appears somewhat caricatural, it does at least retain enough of the denaturing incorporation and cooptation that are, I think, required for such interlocutions to occur. The point I am trying to make is that this kind of scrubbed, disinfected interlocutor is a laboratory creation with suppressed, and therefore falsified, connections to the urgent situation of crisis and conflict that brought him or her to attention in the first place. It was only when subaltern figures like women, Orientals, blacks, and other "natives" made enough noise that they were paid attention to, and asked in so to speak. Before that they were more or less ignored, like the servants in nineteenth-century English novels, there, but unaccounted for except as a useful part of the setting. To convert them into topics of discussion or fields of research is necessarily to change them into something fundamentally and constitutively different. And so the paradox remains.
At this point I should say something about one of the frequent criticisms addressed to me, and to which I have always wanted to respond, that in the process of characterizing the production of Europe's inferior Others, my work is only negative polemic which does not advance a new epistemological approach or method, and expresses only desperation at the possibility of ever dealing seriously with other cultures. These criticisms are related to the matters I've been discussing so far, and while I have no desire to unleash a point-by-point refutation of my critics, I do want to respond in a way that is intellectually pertinent to the topic at hand.
What I took myself to be undertaking in Orientalism was an adversarial critique not only of the field's perspective and political economy, but also of the sociocultural situation that makes its discourse both so possible and so sustainable. Epistemologies, discourses, and methods like Ori-entalism are scarcely worth the name if they are reductively characterized as objects like shoes, patched when worn out, discarded and replaced with new objects when old and unfixable. The archival dignity, institutional authority, and patriarchal longevity of Orientalism should be taken seriously because in the aggregate these traits function as a worldview with considerable political force not easily brushed away as so much epistemology. Thus Orientalism in my view is a structure erected in the thick of an imperial contest whose dominant wing it represented and elaborated not only as scholarship but as a partisan ideology. Yet Orientalism hid the contest beneath its scholarly and aesthetic idioms. These things are what I was trying to show, in addition to arguing that there is no discipline, no structure of knowledge, no institution or epistemology that can or has ever stood free of the various sociocultural, historical, and political formations that give epochs their peculiar individuality. Now it is true of all the numerous theoretical and discursive revaluations, of which I spoke earlier, that they seem to be looking for a way to escape this embroiling actuality. To develop ingenious textual strategies as a way of deflecting the crippling attacks on ethnographic authority mounted by Fabian, Talal Asad, and Gerard Leclerc:8 these strategies have comprised one method for slipping past the hopelessly overlapping, impossibly overinterpreted and conflicted anthropological site. Call it the aesthetic response. The other was to focus more or less exclusively on practice,9 as if practice were a domain of actuality unencumbered by agents, interests, and contentions, political as well as philosophical. Call this the reductively pragmatic response.
In Orientalism I did not think it possible to entertain either of those anesthetics. I may have been disabled by radical skepticism as to grand theory and purely epistemological standpoints. But I did not feel that I could give myself over to the view that an Archimedean point existed outside the contexts I was describing, or that it might be possible to devise and deploy an inclusive interpretive methodology that could hang free of the precisely concrete historical circumstances out of which Orientalism derived and from which it drew sustenance. It has therefore appeared to me particularly significant that anthropologists, and not historians for instance, have been among the most unwilling to accept the rigors of this inescapable truth first formulated cogently by Giambattista Vico. I speculate-and I shall say more about this later-that since it is anthropology above all that has been historically constituted and constructed in its point of origin during an ethnographic encounter between a sovereign European observer and a non-European native occupying, You will have surmised then that neither representation, nor "the colonized," nor "anthropology" and its "interlocutors" can be assigned any very essential or fixed signification. The words seem either to vacillate before various possibilities of meaning or, in some instances, they divide in half. What is most clear about the way they confront us is of course that they are irremediably affected by a number of limits and pressures, which cannot completely be ignored. Thus words like "representation," "anthropology," and "the colonized" are embedded in settings that no amount of ideological violence can dismiss. For not only do we immediately find ourselves grappling with the unstable and volatile semantic ambiance they evoke, but we are also summarily remanded into the actual world, there to locate and occupy if not the anthropological site then the cultural situation in which anthropological work is in fact done.
"Worldliness" is a notion I have often found useful because of two meanings that inhere in it together, one, the idea of being in the secular world, as opposed to being "otherworldly," and two, because of the suggestion conveyed by the French word mondanite, worldliness as the quality 10. In Marcus and Fischer, Anthropology as Cultural Critique, p. 9 and thereafter, the emphasis on epistemology is very prominent.
11. James Clifford, "On Ethnographic Authority," Representations 1 (Spring 1983): 142. of a practiced, slightly jaded savoir faire, worldly wise and street smart.
Anthropology and worldliness (in both senses) necessarily require each other. Geographical dislocation, secular discovery, and the painstaking recovery of implicit or internalized histories: these stamp the ethnographic quest with the mark of a secular energy that is unmistakably frank. Yet the by now massed discourses, codes, and practical traditions of anthropology, with its authorities, disciplinary rigors, genealogical maps, systems of patronage and accreditation have been accumulated into various modes of being anthropological. Innocence is now out of the question of course. And if we suspect that as in all scholarly disciplines, the customary way of doing things both narcotizes and insulates the guild member, we are saying something true about all forms of disciplinary worldliness. Anthropology is not an exception.
Like my own field of comparative literature, anthropology, however, is predicated on the fact of otherness and difference, on the lively, informative thrust supplied to it by what is strange or foreign, "deep-down freshness" in Gerard Manley Hopkins' phrase. These two words, "difference" and "otherness," have by now acquired talismanic properties. Indeed it is almost impossible not to be stunned by how magical, even metaphysical they seem, given the altogether dazzling operations performed on them by philosophers, anthropologists, literary theorists, and sociologists. Yet the most striking thing about "otherness" and "difference" is, as with all general terms, how profoundly conditioned they are by their historical and worldly context. To speak about "the other" in today's United States is, for the contemporary anthropologist here, quite a different thing than say for an Indian or Venezuelan anthropologist: the conclusion drawn by Jurgen Golte in a reflective essay on "the anthropology of conquest" is that even non-American and hence "indigenous" anthropology is "intimately tied to imperialism," so dominant is the global power radiating out from the great metropolitan center.12 To practice anthropology in the United States is therefore not just to be doing scholarly work investigating "otherness" and "difference" in a large country; it is to be discussing them in an enormously influential and powerful state whose global role is that of a superpower.
The fetishization and relentless celebration of"difference" and "otherness" can therefore be seen as an ominous trend. It suggests not only what Jonathan Friedman has called "the spectacularization of anthropology" whereby the "textualization" and "culturization" of societies occur regardless of politics and history,13 but also the heedless appropriation and translation of the world by a process that for all its protestations of relativism, its displays of epistemological care and technical expertise, Critical Inquiry Representing the Colonized cannot easily be distinguished from the process of empire. I have put this as strongly as I have simply because I am impressed that in so many of the various writings on anthropology, epistemology, textualization, and otherness that I have read, which in scope and material run the gamut from anthropology to history and literary theory, there is an almost total absence of any reference to American imperial intervention as a factor affecting the theoretical discussion. It will be said that I have connected anthropology and empire too crudely, in too undifferentiated a way; to which I respond by asking how-and I really mean how-and when they were separated. I do not know when the event occurred, or if it occurred at all. So rather than assuming that it happened, let us see whether there is still some relevance to the topic of empire for the American anthropologist and indeed for us all as intellectuals.
The reality is a daunting one. The facts are that we have vast global interests, and we prosecute them accordingly. There are armies, and armies of scholars at work politically, militarily, ideologically. Consider, for example, the following statement, which quite explicitly makes the connection between foreign policy and "the other": It goes without saying that the imperial system that covers an immense network of patron and client states, as well as an intelligence and policymaking apparatus that is both wealthy and powerful beyond precedent, does not cover everything in American society. Certainly the media is saturated with ideological material, butjust as certainly not everything in the media is saturated to the same degree. By all means we should recognize distinctions, make differentiations, but, we must add, we should not lose sight of the gross fact that the swathe the United States cuts through the world is considerable, and is not merely the result of one Reagan and a couple of Kirkpatricks so to speak, but is also heavily dependent on cultural discourse, on the knowledge industry, on the production and dissemination of texts and textuality, in short, not on "culture" as a general anthropological realm, which is routinely discussed and analyzed in studies of cultural poetics and textualization, but quite specifically on our culture.
The material interests at stake in our culture are very large, and very costly. They involve not only questions of war and peace-for, if in general you have reduced the non-European world to the status of a subsidiary or inferior region, it becomes easier to invade and pacify itbut also questions of economic allocation, political priorities, and, centrally, relationships of dominance and inequality. We no longer live in a world that is three-quarters quiescent and underdeveloped. Nevertheless we have not yet produced an effective national style that is premised on something more equitable and noncoercive than a theory of fateful superiority, which to some degree all cultural ideologies emphasize. The particular cultural form taken by superiority in the context revealed-I cite a typical case-by the New York Times' insensate attack (26 October 1986) on Ali Mazrui for daring as an African to make a film series about Africans, is that as long as Africa is viewed positively as a region that has benefited from the civilizing modernization provided by historical colonialism then it can be tolerated; but if it is viewed by Africans as still suffering under the legacy of empire then it must be cut down to size, shown as essentially inferior, as having regressed since the white man left. And thus there has been no shortage of rhetoric-for example, Pascal Bruckner's Tears of the White Man, the novels of V. S. Naipaul, the recent journalism of Conor Cruise O'Brien-reinforcing that view.
As citizens and intellectuals within the United States, we have a particular responsibility for what goes on between the United States and the rest of the world, a responsibility not at all discharged or fulfilled by indicating that the Soviet Union is worse. The fact is that we are responsible for, and therefore more capable of influencing, this country and its allies in ways that do not apply to the Soviet Union. So we should first take scrupulous note of how-to mention the most obvious-in Central and Latin America, as well as in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, the United States has replaced the great earlier empires as the dominant outside force. Representing the Colonized It is no exaggeration to say that looked at honestly the record is not a good one, that is, if we do not uncritically accept the notion that we are entitled to an almost totally consistent policy of attempting to influence, dominate, and control other states whose relevance, implied or declared, to American security interests is supposed to be paramount. United States military interventions since World War II have occurred in every continent, and what we as citizens are now beginning to understand is only the vast complexity and extent of these interventions, the huge number of ways in which they occur, and the tremendous national investment in them. That they occur is not in doubt, all of which is, in William Appleman Williams' phrase, empire as a way of life. The continuing disclosures of Irangate are part of this complex of interventions, although it is worth noting that in little of the immense media and opinion deluge has there been much attention paid to the fact that our Iranian and Central American policies-whether they have to do with the exploitation of a geopolitical opening amongst Iranian "moderates," or aiding the Contra "freedomfighters" in overthrowing the legally constituted and elected government of Nicaragua-are nakedly imperialist policies.
Without wishing to spend a great deal of time on this perfectly obvious aspect of U.S. policy, I shall therefore neither cite the cases nor engage in silly definitional polemic. Even if we allow, as many have, that U.S. policy abroad is principally altruistic and dedicated to such unimpeachable goals as freedom and democracy, there is considerable room for a skeptical attitude. For are we not, on the face of it, repeating as a nation what France and Britain, Spain and Portugal, Holland and Germany, did before us? And do we not by conviction and power tend to regard ourselves as somehow exempt from the more sordid imperial adventures that preceded ours precisely by pointing to our immense cultural achievements, our prosperity, our theoretical and epistemological awareness? And, besides, is there not an assumption on our part that our destiny is that we should rule and lead the world, a role that we have assigned to ourselves as part of our errand into the wilderness?
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In short what is now before us nationally, and in the full imperial panorama, is the deep, the profoundly perturbed and perturbing question of our relationship to others-other cultures, other states, other histories, other experiences, traditions, peoples, and destinies. The difficulty with the question is that there is no vantage outside the actuality of relationships between cultures, between unequal imperial and nonimperial powers, between different Others, a vantage that might allow one the epistemological privilege of somehow judging, evaluating, and interpreting free of the encumbering interests, emotions, and engagements of the ongoing relationships themselves. When we consider the connections between the United States and the rest of the world, we are so to speak of the connections, not outside and beyond them. It therefore behooves us as intellectuals, humanists, and secular critics to grasp the role of the United States in the world of nations and of power, from within the actuality, and as participants in it, not as detached outside observers who, like Oliver Goldsmith in Yeats' marvelous phrase, deliberately sip at the honeypots of our minds. Now it is certainly the case that the contemporary travails of recent European and American anthropology reflect the conundrums and the embroilments of the problem symptomatically. The history of that cultural practice in Europe and the United States carries within it as a major constitutive element, the unequal relationship of force between the outside Western ethnographer-observer and a primitive, or at least different but certainly weaker and less developed, non-Western society. In Kim Rudyard Kipling extrapolates the political meaning of that relationship and embodies it with extraordinary artistic justice in the figure of Colonel Creighton, an ethnographer in charge of the Survey of India, and also the head of the intelligence services in India, the so-called Great Game to which young Kim belongs. In the recent works of theoreticians who deal with the almost insuperable discrepancy between a political actuality based on force, and a scientific and humane desire to understand the Other hermeneutically and sympathetically in modes not always circumscribed and defined by force, modern Western anthropology both recalls and occludes that problematic novelistic prefiguration.
As to whether these efforts succeed or fail, that is a less interesting matter than the very fact that what distinguishes them, what makes them possible is some very acutely embarrassed if disguised awareness of the imperial setting, which after all is all pervasive and unavoidable. For, in fact, there is no way that I know of apprehending the world from within our culture (a culture by the way with a whole history of exterminism and incorporation behind it) without also apprehending the imperial contest itself. And this I would say is a cultural fact of extraordinary political as well as interpretive importance, because it is the true defining horizon, and to some extent, the enabling condition of such otherwise abstract and groundless concepts like "otherness" and "difference." The real problem remains to haunt us: the relationship between anthropology as an ongoing enterprise and, on the other hand, empire as an ongoing concern.
Once the central wordly problematic has been explicitly reinstated for consideration, at least three derivative issues propose themselves for reexamination together with it. One, to which I referred earlier, is the constitutive role of the observer, the ethnographic "I" or subject, whose status, field of activity, and moving locus taken together abut with embarrassing strictness on the imperial relationship itself. Second is the 
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As I said earlier, and as has been noted by every anthropologist who has reflected on the theoretical challenges now so apparent, there has been a considerable amount of borrowing from adjacent domains, from literary theory, history, and so on, in some measure because much of this has skirted over the political issues for understandable reasons, poetics 
